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Abstract 
It is often believed that the integration of information over time is similar at the unconscious and conscious levels. Here we will 
present four different studies suggesting that the time resolution of unconscious information processing is much better than 
previously believed, but also that information is not integrated over such short intervals like it is at larger times. Even though 
information is unconsciously processed in an almost continuous fashion, it is its time consuming integration that leads to a 
conscious and meaningful percept. We show how neuronal correlates, like e.g., the phase of neuronal oscillations, are associated 
with this transformation. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
We think about time as continuously flowing, as if information is processed without interruptions. However, it 
takes time to integrate information defining different temporal windows (van Wassenhove, 2009; Wittmann, 2009). 
Typically the functional window corresponds to the lowest limit of discrimination between successive events. In the 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 388116471; fax: +33 388116446. 
E-mail address: giersch@unistra.fr 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of the International Conference on Timing and Time 
Perception.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
30   Anne Giersch et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  126 ( 2014 )  29 – 33 
subjective window, on the other hand, successive events are clearly distinguished in time but are all present 
simultaneously in mind. For example, when hearing a melody, the notes just past and the notes to come are all 
present in mind, even though they are known to be past or present. This is what makes it possible to have a sense of 
melody (Husserl, 1928). It is usually believed that these time windows are shared by both conscious and unconscious 
processes. However, this leads to difficulties. For example, if successive events are processed as co-temporal in the 
functional windows, this would imply a succession of snapshots at relatively large intervals of at least 30-50 ms long 
and even longer windows in the case of multisensory information. This seems in contradiction with our sense of time 
continuity, since it is as if time stops within functional windows. Second, it is unclear how different types of 
information are integrated within functional windows, whether unimodal or multisensory. Integration of features 
itself takes some time. Are features, displayed within a functional window, automatically integrated? What kind of 
integration does the functional window entail? To which amount do the functional and subjective windows 
correspond to neuronal constraints? If they do, can we find the neuronal correlates of the temporal windows?  
Here we present different approaches that address these questions aimed at leading to a coherent picture. Taking 
different approaches, both Anne Giersch and Michael Herzog show that the temporal resolution of information 
processing is by far better than subjective experience suggest. Their results suggest the existence of automatic and 
unconscious information processing occurring in time intervals of <20 ms, and that this processing is dissociated 
from information integration associated with consciousness, like temporal order or feature integration. Consistent 
with these observations, Juergen Kornmeier provides electrophysiological evidence that disambiguation of 
ambiguous visual information takes roughly 40-60 ms but conscious perception of the disambiguated information 
needs about 500 ms. Finally, Virginie van Wassenhove uses auditory and visual stimulation to examine the neural 
correlates of temporal integration over 200-300 ms and of temporal order. Results from her group suggest that the 
encoding of event timing in the phase of neural oscillations linearly predicts conscious audiovisual simultaneity. 
All in all, these four approaches suggest that implicit processing of information in time is both richer and less 
integrated than previously believed. We propose that implicit and explicit coding of information over time may serve 
different functions. The high temporal resolution of information coding should not confuse events with each other, 
and allow us to process information in an almost continuous way. On the other hand, relating events with each other 
may not be carried out automatically. The implicit processing of events over time does not correspond to our 
subjective perception of the world, which is much more stable and integrated. It is the possibility to order and 
integrate events that allow us to make our conscious environment meaningful, e.g., to hear a melody rather than 
unrelated notes. These mechanisms of integration would transform unconscious and meaningless bits of information 
into an integrated conscious percept. And it is this transformation that is sub-tended by neural correlates, like the 
phase of neuronal oscillations. The following paragraphs detail each of the four approaches. 
 
2. The functional window and the coding of temporal order: What patients with schizophrenia tell us - 
Anne Giersch 
Exploring information processing over time in patients with schizophrenia can help to better understand their 
thought disorders, e.g., thought disorganization and a disordered sense of time continuity. It can also question the 
normal functioning of the brain.   
Experimentally, patients with schizophrenia are impaired in discriminating between simultaneous and 
asynchronous events, leading to enlarged windows of temporal simultaneity (Giersch et al., 2009). This led us to 
question whether they process all events within functional windows as co-temporal. During the tasks, subjects 
decided whether two squares were displayed simultaneously or asynchronously, and gave their response by hitting a 
left or right response key. We repeatedly showed that when stimuli are asynchronous and displayed on opposite 
sides, manual responses are biased to the side of either the first or second stimulus (Lalanne et al., 2012a,b). Such a 
bias allowed us to show that both patients and controls distinguish events in time at an implicit level even when 
explicitly judging such events to be synchronous. These results show that the temporal resolution of information 
coding is higher than was previously believed. In addition, patients and controls differed on the side of the bias. 
Controls were systematically biased to the side of the second stimulus, whereas patients were biased to the side of 
the first stimulus, but only at short asynchronies. These results show a dissociation between the implicit and explicit 
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processing of information in time in patients with schizophrenia. We suggest that the bias to the side of the second 
stimulus reflects the subject’s ability to automatically follow events over time, which seems impaired in patients. 
Furthermore, patients are also disproportionally impaired when explicitly judging temporal order. We propose that 
the results of the patients reveal the raw processing of information in time, i.e., a distinction of events in time but 
without these events being related with one another. It would take additional mechanisms related to consciousness to 
code the time order and to organize information.  
 
3. The Time of Perception and the Perception of Time are not identical - Michael Herzog 
Often it is assumed that the time of perception is identical or tightly linked to the perception of time. For 
example, we can clearly perceive a 20 ms delay of two squares presented one after the other at nearby locations 
(leading to the percept of apparent motion). Thus, it seems reasonable that also conscious perception operates on a 
"fast" scale. Using a combined feature fusion and TMS experiment, we will show evidence that the duration of 
conscious perception is rather slow in the range of 300 to 500ms. During this epoch, stimuli are unconsciously 
processed. The output of the processing is rendered conscious only at the end of the epoch, even if stimuli were 
presented for short durations only. We propose that temporal features, such as duration and stimulus onset, are 
processed and coded as any other feature, such as color and shape, during this epoch. 
In feature fusion, for example, a red disk is immediately followed by green disk. A yellow disk is perceived. It is 
impossible to perceive the red and green disk individually, i.e., they are unconscious (Efron, 1967). The same holds 
true for verniers, which are two vertical lines slightly offset to the left and right. We presented a left offset vernier 
after a right offset vernier (or vice versa) for 30 ms each. Only one single vernier is perceived with a zero offset 
because the left and right offsets integrate unconsciously. We applied TMS at various SOAs, relative to the vernier 
presentation. Depending on SOA, TMS enhanced selectively, but unconsciously, the contribution of either the first 
or second vernier to the percept of the single, fused vernier. Surprisingly, even though the verniers were presented 
for only 60 ms all together, TMS increased the contribution of the first vernier even when presented 360 ms after 
vernier onset. Hence, feature integration and conscious perception cannot be completed beforehand (Scharnowski et 
al., 2009). We propose that the single vernier is perceived at the end of the 300-500 ms epoch as a "60 ms vernier", 
as the vernier is perceived as white and aligned. Its duration is coded and rendered conscious as any other feature. 
 
4. Ambiguous figures – The time course of spontaneous perceptual alternations – Juergen Kornmeier 
During observation of ambiguous figures, like the Necker cube, our percept is unstable and alternates 
spontaneously between different interpretations although the stimulus stays unchanged (e.g., Blake & Logothetis 
2002; Long & Toppino 2004). This phenomenon may allow in principle to experimentally separating the low-level 
analysis of stimulus features from construction of mental representations and in particular temporal aspects thereof. 
However, the precise time instant of the alternation event is necessary to know but difficult to determine in the case 
of this endogenous event. In the recently developed “onset-paradigm” we presented ambiguous stimuli 
discontinuously with short inter stimulus intervals (ISIs) and used stimulus onset as time reference for the 
alternation instant (Kornmeier et al., 2001; Kornmeier & Bach, 2004). Further, spontaneous endogenous perceptual 
alternations were compared to exogenously induced alternations of disambiguated stimulus variants. This paradigm 
allowed studying EEG correlates of the alternations event with a temporal precision of ±30 ms. The earliest correlate 
of an endogenous alternation was an occipital event related potential (“ERP”) positivity occurring 130 ms after 
stimulus onset and roughly 340 ms before the alternated percept gets conscious. It is followed by an ERP chain with 
several similarities but also differences to ERPs from exogenously induced alternations of the disambiguated 
stimuli. 
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Our results indicate that disambiguation of ambiguous visual information takes roughly 50 ms and is finished 
latest 250 ms after stimulus onset. We will review electrophysiological studies on multistable perception and discuss 
them in the context of temporal aspects of perceptual construction (Kornmeier & Bach, 2012). 
5. Temporal event structure and the brain’s chronoarchitecture. - Virginie van Wassenhove 
One goal of time research is to link the dynamics of brain processes (timing) with the conscious experience of 
time (time perception). Two approaches can be taken. First, and traditionally, the hallmark of time perception is the 
experience of duration or “time quantity” (Lambrechts et al., 2013) necessitating two temporal markers that are the 
onset and the offset of an event. Brain responses to temporal markers can be indexed by the evoked activity (e.g., 
recorded with electro- and magneto-encephalography; EEG and MEG, respectively). However, this presupposes a 
latency-code mechanism for the encoding of events in time, which is difficult to reconcile with the inherent temporal 
delays of cortical information processing (van Wassenhove, 2009). For instance, the temporal coincidence of 
auditory and visual events is a necessary condition for multisensory integration, yet coincidence is defined by the 
brain, not by veridical simultaneity. Consistent with this, the perception of audiovisual (AV) speech tolerates as 
much as 200-300 ms of desynchrony between sensory inputs suggesting the existence of temporal encoding 
windows (van Wassenhove et al., 2007) or temporal constants in the brain (Giraud & Poeppel, 2012; Kösem & van 
Wassenhove, 2012). A second approach then consists in describing neural activity in terms of neural oscillations, 
which naturally provide such temporal constants (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Pöppel, 1997, 2009; Treisman et al., 1990; 
van Wassenhove, 2009). In this view, the dynamics of brain activity provide a logistical platform or 
chronoarchitecture hypothesized to serve canonical operations for temporal event structuring at all scales. If this is 
the case, distinct neurophysiological markers should be found that index the structuring of events in time 
specifically for time perception and temporal cognition. Specifically, we show that the encoding of event timing 
capitalizes on the oscillatory processes at an early stage of sensory processing and that the phase of neural 
oscillations linearly correlates with participants’ perceived AV simultaneity. These results will be discussed in the 
context of information integration/segregation for conscious time perception. 
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